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Airport financial management and meeting airport break-even need are essential
to securing airport financial strength. Airports face challenges during events such as
September 11th, which have the potential to impact their ability to generate reliable
airline related revenue and maintain airport financial strength. Research is conducted
through a literature review of a case study of Lambert St. Louis International Airport,
books, scholarly articles, Government Accountability Office (GAO) documents, and
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) documents in order to describe basic airport
financial management, airport sources of revenue, and airport revenues related to
airline operations. The discussion focuses specifically on whether or not September
11th, the economic recessions from March-November 2001 and December 2007-June
2009, and reductions in American Airlines’ hub service in 2003 and 2009 affected the
financial strength of Lambert by examining Lambert’s Operations, Revenue, AIP
Funding, and Passenger Facility Charges from 1999-2013.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Airport financial prosperity requires a well-balanced airport financial management
strategy. Executing the strategy is critical when it comes to meeting the airport’s breakeven need and securing the airport’s financial strength in terms of credit ratings. Breakeven need is the amount of revenue an airport requires on an annual basis produced by
user charges, lease rentals, and concessions in order to pay for airport expenditures
such as capital investments and operational costs (Young & Wells, 2011). According to
the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE, 2011), “Airports are highly
complex organizations to manage. An airport is the agent of public service, a business,
a community resource, and an essential stakeholder to commerce” (AAAE, 2011, p. 9).
Airport managers use financial management methodologies to maintain this balance in
airport financial accounting practices, especially when managing contracts and revenue
calculations related to the airlines that serve their airport.
These methodologies are tailored to meet the specific needs of a specific airport.
The rights and responsibilities of the airport and the airlines are outlined in a contract
known across the aviation industry as an airport use agreement (Young & Wells, 2011).
Airport managers often make adjustments to their financial management methodology
when there are fluctuations in the revenues the airport depends upon as part of their
use agreements (Young & Wells, 2011). These methodologies provide airport
managers with an effective way of managing the financial resources available to them
for their particular airport’s operations, maintenance, and improvements (Young &
Wells, 2011). Often times, airports are able to generate their own revenue, which
provides enough for operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses such as salaries
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and utilities, but when an improvement project such as terminal expansion or runway
construction may become necessary, capital improvement expenses are incurred. At
that point in time, supplemental funding from federal, state, local resources and airlines
is often needed (Young & Wells, 2011). With all of this fiscal responsibility, it is clear
that an airport must be run as diligently as possible.
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CHAPTER 2 – STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to describe basic airport financial management,
airport sources of revenue, and fluctuations in airport revenues related to airline
operations. Specifically, it provides a case study of Lambert St. Louis International
Airport to discuss whether or not September 11th, the economic recessions from March
- November 2001 and from December 2007 – June 2009, and the 2003 and 2009
reductions in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert affected the airport’s financial
strength. Airline operation fluctuations, and related revenue fluctuations were being
watched by credit rating agencies as the airport was trying to complete its 2005 runway
project. These fluctuations will also be discussed with regard to the effect on the
airport’s financial strength.
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY
Research Question
Have major external events (September 11th, the economic recessions from
March – November 2001 and from December 2007 – June 2009, or the 2003 and 2009
reductions in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert) affected the financial strength
of Lambert St. Louis International Airport? According to the United States Government
Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), “A good indicator of airports’ financial strength is the
number and scale of underlying bond ratings provided by bond-rating agencies” (United
States Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 14).
In order to answer the research questions, this study begins with a literature
review of books, scholarly articles, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
documents, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) documents in order to provide a
basic understanding of airport financial management and to identify main sources of
airport revenue. Next, information will be provided from the case study of Lambert that
discusses the effects of September 11th, the economic recessions from March –
November 2001 and December 2007 – June 2009, and the 2003 and 2009 American
Airlines’ reductions of hub service had on the airport. Finally, data will be plotted from
the FAA to show Lambert’s airline operations numbers compared to national operations
numbers, as well as Lambert’s airport revenues, Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
funding, and Passenger Facility Charges (PFC’s) from 1999 - 2013 in line graphs.
These graphs provide a visual representation to analyze the fluctuations of those
variables as a result of the events of September 11th, the economic recessions, and the
2003 and 2009 reductions in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert.
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CHAPTER 4 – LITERATURE REVIEW
Airport Financial Management
Airport financial management is a complex topic, and many factors must be
considered. “Most U.S. airports are operated as independent, not-for-profit entities with
oversight by a politically-appointed authority, or as self-sustaining enterprise funds of a
governmental entity such as a county, city, or state government” (Airport Cooperative
Research Program, 2007, p. 6) This is a proprietary function of government which
means to act as a private enterprise (AAAE, 2011). “Airport finance is a multilayered
partnership among several levels of government as well as between the public and
private sectors” (Kaps, 2000, p. 263.) Working in this partnership to ensure an airport
has sufficient revenue to meet break-even need can be a challenge as federal, state,
and local budgets fluctuate. “One of the constraints in the public sector is the fund
structure. Public budgeting is based on ‘funds’- that is, separate accounts for separate
purposes” (Rubin, 2010, p. 24.) This can make it difficult for airport managers as airport
revenues must at least break even with expenditures, but exceeding the expenditures is
even better.
Airport expenses can be broken into two broad categories which are: operation
and maintenance (O&M) costs and capital improvement expenses (Young & Wells,
2011). The O&M costs are those that occur regularly and are required to keep the
airport running smoothly while maintaining the present level of operations at the airport.
The O&M costs consist of expenses such as utilities, airport employee salaries, and the
acquisition of supplies ranging from something as costly as airfield lights to the minute
cost of something such as paper clips (Young & Wells, 2011).
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On the other hand, capital improvement expenses are considered the largest
expenses for an airport. Capital improvement at an airport consists of large scale
projects that carry a heavy financial burden. This can include the acquisition of new
land, construction projects such as the expansion of terminal buildings or the extension
of runways as previously mentioned, and even updating firefighting facilities and
procurement of new fire fighting vehicles (Young & Wells, 2011). Most often, airports
are able to pay their own O&M costs, and then exhaust all non-local avenues of funding
such as the AIP funding, PFCs and any other federal, state, and local grants for
improvement projects, and then as a last source of funding, issue debt instruments
such as bonds to pay for the remainder of the projects from the proceeds of those
bonds (Kaps, 2000). Fortunately for airport managers, federal, state, or local funding is
often available and used to subsidize the majority of the costs of the capital
improvement expenses.
Federal Financial Resources
National Airport Capital Needs
After World War II, air travel in the United States became very popular, resulting
in a significant increase in demand on the nation’s airports. Continuity of airports to
support commercial air travel became a necessity, and the concept of a system of
airports was born and combined with the federal funding to support those airports
(Young & Wells, 2011). The ideology first began in 1946 with the Federal Airport Act,
and the first official national plan was developed for the system of airports across the
United States. It was called the National Airport Plan (NAP), and it directed how federal
funds would be allocated to the airports included (Young & Wells, 2011).
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Subsequently, the NAP was required annually by law, which meant that there were
multiple updates, leading up to the National Airport System Plan (NASP), established in
1970 (Young & Wells, 2011).
The NASP was established by the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970,
that provided a more detailed approach to determining airport eligibility for federal
funding, and it categorized airports in order to determine their eligibility for funding
according to the number of annual enplanements (the number of passengers boarding
aircraft) and the type of services provided at each airport (Young & Wells, 2011). Also,
as an integral part of the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund was established, that accrues funds by means of charging user fees,
attaching taxes to fuel, and by generation of other miscellaneous revenues. The trust
was designed to provide funding specifically for the maintenance and improvements of
the nation’s air transportation system (FAA AIP Sponsor Guide-100. Airports Division
Central Region, 2013).
If the airport enplaned 2,500 passengers or more per year, then it was
considered a “commercial service airport”, but if the enplanements fell short of 2,500,
then the airport was considered a “general aviation airport” (GA) airport (Young & Wells,
2011). The FAA went as far as breaking the commercial service airports up into
subcategories according to the most prevalent type of services provided at the facilities,
which identified them as “air carrier” airports or “commuter” airports under the
commercial service airport umbrella. By the end of the NASP in 1982, a total of 780
commercial service airports (635 air carrier + 145 commuter) and 2,423 GA airports
were included in the plan (Young & Wells, 2011). The Nation’s air transportation
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system was growing by leaps and bounds, and a new national plan of airports became
necessary in order to keep up with the growth.
With the passage of the Airport and Airway Trust Act of 1982, the NASP was
superseded by the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), which became
effective by 1984 (Young & Wells, 2011). According to the FAA, the NPIAS is a report,
which is required to be filed every two years with Congress and the public, and it
provides a comprehensive list of airports included in the national system and provides
information about their eligibility for federal funding and the amounts available over a 5
year period (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014). In order to accommodate the
growth of the airport system and to appropriately reallocate the federal funds to airport
needs, the NPIAS re-classified the airport system into four main categories: 1) primary
airports, 2) commercial service airports, 3) GA airports, and 4) reliever airports (Young
& Wells, 2011). As of the 2014 NPIAS, 3,345 (3,331 existing and 14 proposed) public
use airports in the nation are included in the NPIAS because they play an important role
in the infrastructure, and meet the FAA’s criteria to be included in the plan (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2014).
Commercial service airports are included, and they handle the nation’s
scheduled air carrier service, and “the goal of commercial service airports, of course, is
to provide for the safe and efficient movement of passengers and cargo between
population centers through the nation’s aviation system” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 12).
Primary airports are those commercial service airports which accommodate 10,000
passengers or more on an annual basis, but some primary airports receive many more
enplanements than others. To account for this, the FAA subcategorized the primary
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airports as large hubs, medium hubs, small hubs, and nonhubs based upon
enplanement counts (Young & Wells, 2011).
Airports that accommodate less than 2,500 passengers per year are the nation’s
GA and reliever airports. Many, but not all, non-commercial service airports are also
included in the NPIAS because they provide the facilities needed for miscellaneous
aeronautical operations such as flight training and they also help to relieve congestion
at the busiest commercial service airports. Reliever airports are located less than 50
miles from primary airports (Young & Wells, 2011). Waukegan National Airport is a
reliever airport, located 35 miles north of Chicago, which absorbs traffic from Chicago
O’Hare International Airport. (Waukegan Airport, 2015).
The 2015–2019 NPIAS reflects the FAA’s need for total capital expenditure in
the next five years as $33.5 billion (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014). The airports
included in the NPIAS will be those which receive funding through the Airport
Improvement Program (AIP). Airports must be part of the NPIAS in order to receive AIP
funds (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).
AIP Funding
The AIP is a federal government grant program, which contributes to the
improvements of airport facilities within the Nation’s airport system, and provides
financial assistance to airports for the purposes of planning, development, capacity
enhancement, and noise compatibility programs which the airports cannot afford within
their own financial structure (Young & Wells, 2011). A limit has been set on the types
of projects which are eligible for this funding, and in the FAA’s AIP Sponsor Guide, a list
of examples is presented which includes projects that do not qualify for AIP such as
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landscaping, artwork, parking facilities, airport operational costs such as salaries, or
exclusive use areas such as Fixed Base Operator (FBO) areas within the airport apron
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2013). “Because the demand for AIP funds exceeds
the availability, the FAA bases distribution of limited AIP funds on current national
priorities and objectives. Projects that rate a high priority will receive higher
consideration for funding over those projects with lower priority ratings” (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2013, p. 100-2). According to the last re-authorization from the
FAA at the end of June 2013, eligible primary airports can be provided with federal
funds for 75 percent of the costs of a project (one exception - 80 percent for noise
program implementation), but the remaining 20 or 25 percent must come from state and
local funds, bond issues, or airport revenues (FAA AIP Sponsor Guide-100. Airports
Division Central Region, 2013). “Funds granted to airports by the AIP are provided in
three different funding categories: entitlement, set-aside, and discretionary funds”
(Young & Wells, 2011, p. 342).
In a nutshell, of the three types of funds, entitlement funds are the largest,
accounting for about 50 percent of all AIP funds distributed and these are appropriated
based on the number of passenger enplanements the airport has per year (Young &
Wells, 2011). Next, the “set-side funds are available to any eligible airport sponsor and
are allocated according to congressionally mandated requirements for a number of
different set-aside subcategories” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 343.) Congress allocates
the set-aside funds based upon specific needs of specific areas in the nation, and the
areas with the most need will benefit first (Young & Wells, 2011). And last, but not
least, the discretionary funds are granted by the FAA in order to accomplish the goals
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of Congress such as improving safety, increasing security, and increasing the capacity
capabilities of an airport. These funds are distributed to projects which are the highest
priority to complete (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013).
The federal government issues federal letters of intent (LOI) as a statement in
writing, which promulgates the FAA’s intent to provide federal funding for approved
airport projects (Young & Wells, 2011). “Projects are prioritized according to their
function: 1) airport safety and security; 2) preservation of existing infrastructure; 3) aid
compliance with governmental standards (e.g., noise migration); 4) upgrade of service;
5) increase in airport system capacity” (Young & Wells, 2011, pg. 345). A LOI is not
always a dependable source of revenue as it is not a promise from the FAA that they
will definitely provide the funds. If Congress cuts the federal budget, or an airport fails
to meet their projected level of enplanements, then the AIP discretionary funding may
be cut. For this reason, airport managers should not fully depend on an LOI that they
receive, however, LOI’s can provide a basis for airports to borrow funds or issue bonds
(Young & Wells, 2011).
For many years, the AIP funding was enough to sustain the Nation’s airport
system, but that began to change in the late 1980’s as the need for growth continued.
As the federal dollars were stretched more and more, shortages in funding became
more and more prevalent, and the need for additional funding became quite obvious.
As a result, Congress passed the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990,
which gave publicly owned airports the right to charge fees for passengers boarding
aircraft (enplaned passengers), called Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) (Young &
Wells, 2011). Enplaned passengers are defined as “the total number of revenue

12
passengers boarding aircraft, including originating, stopover, and transfer passengers,
in scheduled and nonscheduled services” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 532).
Passenger Facility Charges
Passenger Facility Charges were developed under Federal Aviation Regulation
(FAR) Part 158 as a supplementary form of capital for financing airport development
when shortages in traditional funding through the AIP occurred (Young & Wells, 2011).
Airport sponsors (public agencies that control a commercial service airports) must apply
to the FAA, be approved for, and impose PFC’s in accordance with FAR Part 158 as
applicable to specific airport type, projects, and need (Federal Aviation Administration,
2014). According to the FAA, “No public agency may impose a PFC under this part
unless authorized by the Administrator” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, pg. 6).
In FAR Part 158, it states that the dollar amounts which can be charged include $1.00,
$2.00, or $3.00 for projects which “(1) preserve or enhance safety, security, or capacity
of the national air transportation system; (2) reduce noise or mitigate noise impacts
resulting from an airport; or (3) furnish opportunities for enhanced competition between
or among air carriers” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, p. 9). Also, a $4.00 or
$4.50 PFC can be assessed if a project meets the same requirements outlined above
as well as “if the project will make significant contribution to improving air safety and
security, increasing competition among air carriers, reducing current or anticipated
congestion, or reducing the impact of aviation noise on people living near the airport”
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, p. 11).
Projects which are financed with PFC’s are required to be included in the
airport’s latest airport layout plan, which already contains an FAA approval for that
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particular project (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014). PFC’s can be very useful
sources of revenue for airport sponsors and can even be used to support a bond issue.
“PFC revenue can finance the entire allowable cost of a project or can be used to pay
debt service or related expenses for bonds issued to fund an eligible project. A PFC is
considered local revenue and may be used to meet the non-federal share of projects
funded under the AIP” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 344.) Airport management must
specify the projects, and these projects must be part of the airport’s FAA approved
Airport Master Plan or Airport Improvement Plan in order to be funded before issuing
the PFC’s, and the PFC’s must be used with caution. There is a possiblity that the
revenue generated from PFC’s can be unstable at times due to lower than projected
enplanements, if an airline files for bankruptcy, or if an airline shifts operations away
from that airport and fails to fulfill its financial obligations (Young & Wells, 2011).
State / Local Funding / Bonds
State grants are offered by state departments of transportation. These grants are
typically allowed to fund approximately 90 percent of a project at an airport in the state
of domicile and the airport sponsor is left with the remaining debt obligation. This state
grant funding is typically derived from a general tax base as well as highway tolls,
automobile registrations, fuel taxes, and other miscellaneous fees (Young & Wells,
2011).
After airport sponsors exhaust their federal, state, and local funding, their largest
source of airport financing reverts to bond financing as PFCs and AIP funding is simply
not enough to subsidize all airport capital needs (Kaps, 2000). According to the FAA,
more than $18 billion in bonds were issued in the year 2011 (FAA National Plan of
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Integrated Airport Systems 2013-2017, 2012). The bonds that are most commonly
used by airport sponsors include: general obligation bonds (GOB), general airport
revenue bonds (GARB), and special facilities bonds (Young & Wells, 2011).
GOB’s are issued by the municipality that owns and operates the airport and the
debt is secured by the full faith and credit of citizens of the community via taxation
(Kaps, 2000). “General obligation bonds are the responsibility of the citizenry of a
particular locality to repay the amount borrowed” (Kaps, 2000, p. 256).
GARB’s are an additional type of bond issue that airports may utilize to fund
projects. This type of bond differs from the GOB as the debt obligation under a GARB
rests soley upon the airport sponsor,and is not backed by any additional subsidy such
as taxes from the general public in the taxing district (Kaps, 2000).
Special Facility Bonds, also known as Self-Liquidating General Obligation Bonds,
are backed by the citizenry just as GOBs are, however, there is a difference in
repayment methods. The repayment of a Special Facility Bond is accomplished
throught the use of revenue from the indebted facility (Kaps, 2000). One of the most
familiar, general examples of this is a toll road. When cars drive over the newly
constructed roadway they must pay a toll. After years of toll collection (revenue) from
use of that roadway, the debt is repayed in full. The same practice is utilized at airports
for new runways, terminal buildings, etc. When airlines land on the new runway, there
is a landing fee instated and those revenues from the landing fees help to pay back the
debt the airport sponsor incurred as a result of constructing that new runway (Kaps,
2000).

15
Airport Use Agreements and Financial Management Methodology
Official documentation is needed in order to identify exactly what a commercial
service airport is financially responsible for and what the air carriers are financially
responsible for. A contract commonly referred to as an Airport Use Agreement is drawn
up, and this describes the terms and conditions as well as the rights and responsibilities
of the air carriers’ use of the airport (Wells & Young, 2004). Many of the items in this
agreement include: leases for the use of the airfield, leases of terminal facilities, the
calculations for the rates that the airport will charge the air carrier and even an outline of
the air carriers’ privileges or rights when financial decisions are being made for
development projects at the airport (Wells & Young, 2004).
As previously mentioned, airport managers employ financial management
methodologies in order to manage the revenues derived from these airport use
agreements and to adhere to airport financial accounting practices. Either the residual
or compensatory financial management methodology can be employed, or a
combination of the two. There is no legal requirement stating that airport sponsors
must use a certain methodology, but these methods are a great way for airport
sponsors to control how revenues will be generated and utilized to ensure an airport
meets its break-even need (Kaps, 2000).
Residual Financial Management Method
The residual financial management method is often used at many of the larger
commercial service airports. This method allows for one or more airlines that provide
service to the airport to assume a large portion of the airport’s financial risk via the
airport use agreement (Wells & Young, 2004). The financial risks placed upon the air
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carrier include making up the difference for any deficit that the airport may find itself in
after exhausting all other revenue streams such as automobile parking, terminal
concessions, and any other identified revenue streams (Wells & Young, 2004).
Inception of the residual method occurred back in the 1950’s with the city of
Chicago’s O’Hare Field making an agreement with United Airlines for a period of 50
years. The agreement stated that the airport would generate all of the revenue that it
possibly could from all of its other airport users, but whatever airport expenditures
exceeded their revenues for the year would be paid by United Airlines (Wells & Young,
2004). This agreement basically served as an insurance policy for the airport, and if the
airport spent more than it was supposed to, then United Airlines would pay the tab to
make sure that the airport met its break-even need. Airports using the residual method
are guaranteed to break-even.
Long-term agreements were used quite frequently before the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978. Air carriers were flying specifically planned routes and using
preferred airports as a central location, or “hub” as defined by the air carriers, for
transferring passengers known as the “hub and spoke” system (Young & Wells, 2011).
After deregulation, the air carriers were competing, and many were less likely to stay at
one airport for a long period of time. Deregulation made it easy for the air carriers to
enter and exit the airport market (AAAE, 2011). This made the residual method less
likely to be used because these residual agreements depended on the financial stability
of the air carriers, and in a deregulated environment, they were no longer financially
stable (AAAE, 2011).
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Following deregulation, there has been a trend among airport managers in
diversifying their revenues. After this started taking place, many airports have switched
to another financial management practice called the compensatory financial
management method. Some airports even use a combination or hybrid of the two
methodologies because airport revenues are all about how costs are defined in the
agreements (AAAE, 2011).
Compensatory Financial Management Method
The compensatory financial management method became the most commonly
used approach, post deregulation, because airports could no longer count on airlines to
provide dependable revenues under the residual methodology. Airport managers
started gaining interest in the use of the compensatory method because it allows for
more flexibility and control, with shorter terms on leases and use agreements (AAAE,
2011). Under the compensatory agreement between air carriers and the airport, the
airport assumes the financial risks of operations and not the air carrier (Wells & Young,
2004). The airport is responsible for making sure that their expenditures do not exceed
their revenues (AAAE, 2011). The air carriers are not responsible for ensuring that the
airport meets its debt service requirements and break-even need for the year, as the
residual methodology did. The air carriers are held responsible for paying their rent for
the use of space at the facility, and may also be charged landing fees for the use of the
facility as a part of the total compensatory package (Wells & Young, 2004).
Ultimately, airport sponsors are responsible for ensuring the airport continues to
operate smoothly, and financial planning is one of the biggest factors to consider,
especially when dealing with several variables that can come into play when dealing
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with public budgeting and the volatility of the aviation industry. Airlines are merging and
changing their hubs, and according to the ACRP, “with costs of construction increasing,
airlines filing for bankruptcy, and periodic economic downturns affecting the industry,
airport operators find themselves continually looking for additional revenue sources to
fund capital projects and sustain operations” (Airport Cooperative Research Program,
2007, p. 24). This is exactly the position that Lambert St. Louis International Airport
found itself in, especially after TWA went bankrupt and American Airlines assumed
TWA’s responsiblities under the airport use agreement set to expire in December 2005.
American formed AMR Sub Corporation to fulfill the obligations of the use agreement
until expiration, but shortly after forming AMR Sub, decided to reduce their St. Louis
hub operation in 2003 and reduced the amount of service offered from over 400 flights
per day to 200 with 50-60 of those flights conducted via Amerian mainline as part of
their “turnaround plan” as they focused their efforts on growing their hub operations in
Chicago and Dallas/Fort Worth. And in 2009, American went a step further, closing
their hub at Lambert.
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CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDY OF LAMBERT ST. LOUIS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
The City of St. Louis, Missouri owns and operates the Lambert St. Louis
International Airport as a self-sufficient enterprise fund (John F. Brown Airport
Management Associates, 2003). According to the AAAE, “An airport operated
completely by a municipality, such as a city or county, means that the airport is a
division or department of the city or county” (AAAE, 2011, p. 17.) There are both
advantages and disadvantages to this type of ownership. According to AAAE, “the
advantage of an airport being municipally owned is that the airport administration has
access to the resources of other city or county departments. These resources may
exceed what the airport’s administration could justify if it operated on a stand-alone
basis” (AAAE, 2011, p. 19.) “The disadvantage of a municipally owned airport is that in
times of financial constraints, the airport is often viewed as a liability or suffers
corresponding budget reductions or personnel restrictions (such as mandatory furlough
days) as other departments in the local government. Airports are also competing for
the same attention and leadership consideration as other departments or divisions with
the municipal government” (AAAE, 2011, p. 19.)
Lambert St. Louis International Airport’s finances are separate from that of the
City of St. Louis itself. Even so, the Airport Authority saw itself through some interesting
times as airline operations fluctuated as a result of external factors, which had an affect
on main sources of revenue. Lambert was in the process of completing a new runway
project which the FAA had filed its Record of Decision in 1998 allowing the project to
begin under Phase I of the Airport Development Program ($1.1 billion), with projected
completion in 2006 (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003). During the
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project, several factors worked against them including September 11 , the economic
recessions, and American Airlines’ reduction of service as well as the expiration their
airport use agreement in 2005 with American Airlines (originally TWA). As a result of
those factors, Lambert dealt with its biggest concern, fluctuating airline operations
which impacted airline revenues, AIP Funding, and PFCs. According to the airport
consultant, funding for the new runway was supposed to come mainly from GARBs,
PFC revenues for the purpose of backing bonds and pay-as-you-go revenues, and AIP
grants (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).
Unfortunately for Lambert, the USGAO’s way of determining an airports’ financial
strength was by the number and scale of underlying bond ratings provided by bondrating agencies (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 14).
Lambert’s PFCs were fluctuating and the credit rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s
Investors Service, and Standard and Poor’s use PFCs to evaluate passenger traffic
(enplanements) and airport financial strength and credit. According to the airport
consultant, Fitch and Moody’s placed Lambert on their negative watch list right after
September 11th because they were concerned about the reduced amount of
enplanements which also meant reduced PFC revenue (John F. Brown Airport
Management Associates, 2003). The consultant went on to say “A downgrade to STL’s
credit rating could affect the City’s ability to access the bond market for more GARBs to
complete the funding of the runway program in light of potential shortfall in PFC
PAYGO funding for the project” (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003,
p. 40). Lambert’s credit was already under review by the credit rating agencies following
September 11, 2001, when, immediately following American’s announcement to reduce
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service in 2003, all three credit rating agencies dropped the Lambert’s credit rating, and
placed the airport on their watch lists for further negative action in the future (John F.
Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).
This hit the airport when it needed it’s financial strength the most as the runway
project was not supposed to be completed until 2006. The airport management had to
handle the impact of each external factor the best way they could. After September
th

11 Lambert’s airport management conducted a reassessment of the five-year capital
needs of the airport. The decision was made to only move forward with projects which
were considered essential to the safe operation of the airport or that would allow for
more revenue generation such as long-term parking facilities or construction of
additonal space for concessionaires (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates,
2003). The airport management also took steps such as refinancing bonds to take
advantage of lower interest rates and deferred around $76 million in project costs in
their Capital Improvement Program (CIP) until 2004 or later. The National Bureau of
Economic Research officially named March, 2001 to November, 2001 as well as
December, 2007 to June, 2009 as recession periods (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2011). The latter was considered to be the greatest recession in length, with
a total of 18 months, since World War II (National Bureau of Economic Research,
2011).
Lambert had an airport use agreement with Trans World Airlines (TWA) which
became effective on August 1, 1965 and the carrier was Lambert’s primary hub carrier
for many years (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003). TWA filed for
bankruptcy three separate times within nine years and sought protection under the
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Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code in January of 1992, again in June of 1995, and the
final time in January of 2001 (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).
In the third round, TWA sold all of its assets to American Airlines, and through this
absorbtion of assets as well as other contracts and agreements with St. Louis,
American formed AMR Sub Corporation named in order to operate as a “transitional
airline” which gave it the ability to assume the remainder of TWA’s airport use
agreement with Lambert which was set to expire on December 31, 2005. The airport
had a compensatory rate collection practice and an antiquated airline use agreement in
place (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).
AMR Sub Corporation started operating as the transitional airline on April 10,
2001, and by July 16, 2003 American Airlines decided to reduce the amount of service
they offered out of the St. Louis hub because they wanted to focus on building stronger
hub operations in Chicago and Dallas/Fort Worth. According to the airport consultant,
American (originally TWA) had a total of 473 daily departures from Lambert which
accounted for approximately 78 percent of all enplaned passengers at Lambert since
the 1990’s (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003). American intially
started with a 20% cutback in the number of flights they would be offering, and by
November of 2003 the airline had cut service down by 50% (John F. Brown Airport
Management Associates, 2003). Not only that, but of the flights remaining at St. Louis,
the airport consultant estimated the total number of connecting passengers would
decline over 70 percent due to American’s reduction of mainline service and
enplanements because of the use of smaller regional airline aircraft. The consultant
went on to say that, “if American does not restore service levels or if another airline
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does not establish a major hub operation at STL, it is likely that substaintial amounts of
terminal space will remain unleased after 2005” (John F. Brown Airport Management
Associates, 2003, p. 39.) This was detrimental to Lambert’s financial situation as the
Authority was dependent upon that revenue.
In this time period, Lambert found itself in the middle of a new runway project
which was designed to allow dual independent aircraft arrivals during poor weather
conditions, and improve airport efficiency with a cost projected to be $1.1 billion (John
F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003). The airport was dependent upon
revenue from the airlines using their facility to pay for this project, and they were relying
especially hard on American Airlines to pay their debt service payments on GARBs,
PFC-supported GARBs, PFC pay-as-you-go revenues (PAYGO), and other internally
generated revenues (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).
According to the ACRP, Lambert “has compensatory rate-making for its airline
terminals and residual rate-setting for its landing fees” (Airport Cooperative Research
Program, 2009, p. 9.) As previously stated, “under the residual method, the financial
risk is tranferred to the airlines in return for a negotiated limit on an airport’s profits”
(AAAE, 2011, p. 72.) But, if the airline, American Airlines in this case, was not providing
the projected amount of service (landings and enplaned passengers) to Lambert, then
there was obviously going to be a reduction in the amount of revenue generated by the
airline.
In FY 2002, the revenue generated from American and TWA amounted to 69
percent of the overall revenue from the airlines at Lambert, and 45 percent of the total
operating revenue for the airport overall (John F. Brown Airport Management
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Associates, 2003). This meant that there was going to be less airline revenue as a
result of fewer PFCs being collected and less terminal space being occupied, and this
meant the Authority was going to have difficulty paying the debt service on their GARBs
(John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003). In 2003, the City of St. Louis
estimated their total PFC revenue needed to pay debt service on their PFC eligible debt
paid toward bond principal to be about $20 million per year. Also, in 2003, they
estimated their total PFC revenue to be around $53 million (John F. Brown Airport
Management Associates, 2003).
At the time the case study was conducted, the airport consultant said “the debt
service for the new runway will become payable from airport revenues after the existing
use agreements expire, placing further pressure on airline unit costs at that time,
especially the landing fee rate, which would become one of the highest in the nation”
(John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003). Subsequent to the December
31, 2005 expiration of the airport use agreement with AMR Sub Corporation, Lambert
had to make adjustments to their revenue structure because the costs associated with
the operations of the new runway entered the airline rate base (John F. Brown Airport
Management Associates, 2003). Lambert’s airport management had to diversify their
revenues accordingly, meaning that adjustments to other forms of revenue such as
landing fees and terminal use fees accrued from all airlines using the airport would
have to make up for the deficit (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).
It also helped that the FAA provided Lambert with a LOI, stating that it would provide
141.4 million under the AIP and the FAA also approved Lambert’s use of $900 million in
PFC revenue to fund the runway project (John F. Brown Airport Management
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Associates, 2003).
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CHAPTER 6 - FINDINGS
In a perfect world, meeting break-even need and achieving airport financial
prosperity are the goals of every airport manager. As previously discussed, many
factors play a critical role in achieving those goals. One of the most important factors
is/are the airport use agreement(s) that the airport has in place with airlines offering
service at that airport. Airline derived revenue contributes significantly not only toward
the costs of operating and maintaining the airport, but also with improvements such as
building a new runway like at Lambert St. Louis International Airport. However, in
reality, both controllable factors such as runway projects, as well as uncontrollable
factors such as economic recessions can have an impact on airport finances as
discussed in the case study of Lambert St. Louis International Airport. Airport
managers must make adjustments to their financial management methodology in order
to maintain airport financial strength in both good times and bad. These methodologies
provide airport managers with an effective way to manage financial resources available
to their airport (Young & Wells, 2011). The case study of Lambert St. Louis
International Airport provided excellent examples of controllable and uncontrollable
factors, or external events, which had the potential to affect airport revenue related to
airline operations at Lambert such as PFC’s.
Those events facilitated the subsequent discussion of Lambert St. Louis
International Airport’s Operation Numbers, Revenue, AIP Funding, and PFC’s, and are
examined to see if any fluctuations in these variables could be linked to external events
including September 11th, the economic recession from March to November 2003, the
economic recession from December 2007 to June 2009, and the reductions in
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American Airlines’ hub service in 2003 and 2009. This data is examined and discussed
with the goal of finding answers to the following research questions regarding whether
or not the major external events had an effect on the financial strength of Lambert St.
Louis International Airport from 1999-2013.
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September 11th
Did September 11th affect the Operations at Lambert St. Louis International
Airport?

Figure 1-A. Lambert Operations
Source: FAA

Yes, the number of operations at Lambert were clearly affected by September
11th. In fact, the number of operations at Lambert as well as the number of operations
nationally both dropped significantly in 2001 as a result of the tragedy. However, the
number of operations do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the
fluctuations in operations as a result of September 11th affected the financial strength of
Lambert.
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Did September 11 affect the Revenue generated at Lambert St. Louis
International Airport?

Figure 2-A. Lambert Revenue
Source: FAA

September 11th did not cause fluctuations in the revenue generated at Lambert.
The revenues did not increase quite as much as in previous years, but a gradual
increase in revenue still existed between the years 2001 and 2002. Furthermore, the
amount of revenue generated does not provide sufficient information to conclude that
fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in revenue as a result of September 11th affected the
financial strength of Lambert.
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Did September 11 affect the AIP Funding at Lambert St. Louis
International Airport?

Figure 3-A. Lambert AIP Funding
Source: FAA

September 11th did not affect the AIP Funding for Lambert. A steady increase in
the funding appears to have existed from 2001 to 2002, almost leveling off in 2003.
It appears that the runway project was the governing force when it came to the
amount of AIP funding awards at Lambert. The year 2003 was the peak year for
funding the runway project, and this graph makes that very clear. Then there is a
steady downward trend until 2006 as a result of the funding tapering off after
completion of the runway project. Furthermore, the amount of AIP Funding does not
provide sufficient information to conclude that fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP
Funding as a result of September 11th affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did September 11 affect the PFC Funding at Lambert St. Louis
International Airport?

Figure 4-A. Lambert PFC Funding
Source: FAA

September 11th did have a short-lived affect on the number of PFC’s collected at
Lambert. And, as previously stated in the research, bond rating agencies Fitch and
Moody’s both placed Lambert on their negative watch list right after September 11 th for
fear of a reduced amount of passenger enplanements (John F. Brown Airport
Management Associates, 2003).
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Economic Recession from March to November 2001
Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 1-B. Lambert Operations
Source: FAA

Based upon this data, and the previously presented research, it is unclear
whether or not the economic recession itself had a negative impact on the operation
numbers at Lambert during the last half of 2001, or if it was as a result of September
11th, or a combination of the two events. Furthermore, the number of operations do not
provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations in operations as a result
of the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affected the financial
strength of Lambert.
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Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the
Revenue at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 2-B. Lambert Revenue
Source: FAA

The economic recession in 2001 may be the reason why revenues appear to
have almost flattened out from 2001 to 2002 with only a gradual increase that existed,
but it is unclear whether or not the economic recession itself had a negative impact on
the revenue at Lambert during the last half of 2001, or if it was as a result of September
11th, or a combination of the two events. Furthermore, the amount of revenue
generated does not provide sufficient information to conclude that fluctuations in
revenue as a result of the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affected
the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the AIP
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 3-B. Lambert AIP Funding
Source: FAA

No, the economic recession of 2001 does not seem to have affected AIP funding
for Lambert. A slight increase in funding seems to have existed.
Once again, it appears that the runway project was the governing force when it
came to the amount of AIP funding awards at Lambert. The year 2003 was the peak
year for funding the runway project, and this graph makes that very clear. Then there is
a steady downward trend until 2006 as a result of the funding tapering off after
completion of the runway project. Furthermore, the amount of AIP Funding does not
provide sufficient information to conclude that fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP
Funding as a result of the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affected
the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the PFC
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 4-B. Lambert PFC Funding
Source: FAA

Yes, based on this data, the economic recession of 2001 appears to have had
an affect on the number of PFC’s collected at Lambert, but, again, it is more likely that
the drop in the number of operations can be attributed to September 11 th, or a
combination of the two events.
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Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009
Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 1-C. Lambert Operations
Source: FAA

Based on this data, the economic recession from December 2007 to June 2009
did not affect the number operations that took place at Lambert. This economic
recession occurred around the same time that American Airlines was reducing
operations and closing their hub at Lambert. However, no drop in Lambert operation
numbers existed for the period of December 2007 to June 2009. Also, according to the
research previously presented, the consistency of operations for the period of
December 2007 to June 2009 was most likely attributed to AirTran Airways’ new
presence at Lambert, with operations that started in May of 2007. According to
Lambert St. Louis International Airport, AirTran served more than 197,000 passengers
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out of a total of 15.38 million passengers (boardings and arrivals) by the end of 2007
(Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 2008). Furthermore, the number of operations
do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations, or lack thereof, in
operations as a result of the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009
affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the
Revenue at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 2-C. Lambert Revenue
Source: FAA

Yes, during the economic recession of 2007 to 2009, it appears that there was a
decline in revenues from 2007 to 2008, followed by another steady revenue increase
from 2008 to 2009, with no sustained affect on revenue at Lambert. After the 2005
expiration of the airline lease agreement, a debt stabilization fund was established, and
was funded incrementally from 2007 – 2011 from unused revenue fund money
(Standard & Poors, 2006). Also, most likely, Air Tran’s presence and expansion of
operations impacted this. According to Lambert St. Louis International Airport’s Director
at that time, Richard Hrabko, in a media release on February 10, 2009, “Our
passengers have really embraced AirTran Airways in the last two years because of its
service and fares.” (Lambert St. Louis International Airport). Furthermore, the amount

39
of revenue generated does not provide sufficient information to conclude that
fluctuations in revenue as a result of the Economic Recession from December 2007 to
June 2009 affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the
AIP Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 3-C. Lambert AIP Funding
Source: FAA

By looking at this data by itself, it appears that the economic recession from
2007 to 2009 affected the AIP Funding at Lambert. But the data is misleading, as the
runway project was the governing force when it came to the amount of AIP funding
awards at Lambert. The year 2003 was the peak year for funding the runway project,
and this graph makes that very clear. Then there is a steady downward trend until 2006
as a result of the funding tapering off after completion of the runway project followed by
an increase from 2008 to 2009. This data alone is inconclusive, and it appears that
projects affected AIP Funding more than the economic recession. Furthermore, the
amount of AIP Funding does not provide sufficient information to conclude that
fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP Funding as a result of the Economic Recession
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from December 2007 to June 2009 affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the
PFC Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 4-C. Lambert PFC Funding
Source: FAA

According to this data, yes, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 did affect
the number of PFC’s collected at Lambert. There appears to be a very slight decline in
collections from 2007 to 2008, almost leveling off, but from 2008 to 2009 there was a
decline in PFC collection at Lambert followed by another leveling out all the way to
2013.
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2003 Reduction in American Airlines’ Hub Service
Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 1-D. Lambert Operations
Source: FAA

The drop in Lambert operation numbers in 2003 indicates that American Airlines’
reduction in service was responsible. This drop in operations is supported by the
research previously presented, because, American Airlines announced the reduction of
hub service in July of 2003, which became effective in November 2003. The data
shows that Lambert was only involved as the national operation numbers did not seem
to change nearly as drastically as Lambert’s. Furthermore, the number of operations
do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations, or lack thereof, in
operations as a result of the reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affected the
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financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the Revenue
at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 2-D. Lambert Revenue
Source: FAA

The 2003 reduction of American Airlines’ service did not have a sustained affect
the revenue at Lambert. The peak of AIP funding awards (see figure 3) hit the airport in
2003 as the revenues spiked, however, after that, the American Airlines’ reduction in
service commencing in 2003 shows that there was a significant drop in revenues for the
STL with an approximate 18 percent drop in revenue by the year 2005. From 2005 on,
based on the sharp increase in revenues depicted in this data, and based upon the
research previously presented, the airport management made adjustments to Lambert’s
landing fee calculations. According to Standard and Poors, after the 2005 expiration of
the airline lease agreement, “the airport has been able to raise landing fees to offset
lower activity levels to better cover expenses” (Standard & Poors, 2006). Standard and
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Poors went on to say that the airport was well managed, and “even though the airport
experienced a steep decline in total enplanements following American Airlines’
dehubbing, it did not sustain a material drop in revenues” (Standard & Poors, 2006). In
2005, following the expiration of the airport use agreement with American Airlines, it
appears that the airport management made some adjustments to their airline revenue
calculations, and this could be the reason for the steady increase in revenue from 2005
to 2007. Furthermore, the amount of revenue generated does not provide sufficient
information to conclude that fluctuations in revenue as a result of the 2003 reduction in
American Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the AIP
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 3-D. Lambert AIP Funding
Source: FAA

The American reduction of service in the year 2003 does not appear to affect the
AIP funding in this graph, but, once again, this graph is not a true indication and is a
false reading of AIP funding. The AIP funding for the new runway just happened to be
at its peak between 2003 and 2004 and this skewed the data because of the lag in
funding awards. This line is a steady downward trend after 2003. Furthermore, the
amount of AIP Funding does not provide sufficient information to conclude that
fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP Funding as a result of the 2003 reduction in
American Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the PFC
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 4-D. Lambert PFC Funding
Source: FAA

Yes, the amount of PFC’s collected at Lambert decreased significantly as a
result of American Airline’s reduction in service in 2003. This was particulary true
between the years of 2003 to 2005. The PFC’s collected dropped from $50,525,583 in
2003 down to $27,164,387 in 2005 (author’s percentage change calculations). That’s a
drop of nearly 50%. This data, even though a general overview, proves that the credit
rating agencies had a right to be concerned.
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2009 Reduction in American Airlines’ Hub Service
Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 1-E. Lambert Operations
Source: FAA

Yes, the 2009 reductions in American Airlines’ hub service did cause a drop in
the operations at Lambert, and lasted until the beginning of 2011. In the 2004-2010
period, American Airlines had a 200 flight per day hub in operation for the vast majority
of the period, however, after September 2009, American Airlines cut the number of
flights down from 200 per day to about 40 per day. Furthermore, the number of
operations do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations, or lack
thereof, in operations as a result of the reduction in American Airlines’ hub service
affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the Revenue
at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 2-E. Lambert Revenue
Source: FAA

Based on this data, the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service did not
affect revenue at Lambert. There may be a possible explanation for this though.
Subsequent to the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert,
Standard and Poors said that “the airport has been able to raise landing fees to offset
lower activity levels to better cover expenses” going on to say that the airport was well
managed, and “even though the airport experienced a steep decline in passenger
enplanements following American Airlines’ dehubbing, it did not sustain a material drop
in revenues” (Standard & Poors, 2006). And, according to Standard and Poors, after
the 2005 expiration of the airline use agreement, a debt stabilization fund was
established at Lambert, and was funded incrementally from 2007 to 2011 from unused
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revenue fund money (Standard & Poors, 2006). The debt stabilization fund appears to
be the reason why the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service does not
appear to have had an affect on revenue numbers at Lambert, at least until after 2010.
Furthermore, the amount of revenue generated does not provide sufficient information
to conclude that fluctuations in revenue as a result of the 2009 reduction in American
Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of Lambert.
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Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the AIP
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 3-E. Lambert AIP Funding
Source: FAA

No, the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service did not affect AIP
funding. Again, projects are the governing force for AIP funding awards at Lambert,
and this graph is not a true indication of AIP funding fluctuations. The AIP funding for
the new runway just happened to be at its peak between 2003 and 2004 and this
skewed the data because of the lag in funding awards. This line is a steady downward
trend after 2003. Furthermore, the amount of AIP Funding does not provide sufficient
information to conclude that fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP Funding as a result
of the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of
Lambert.
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Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the PFC
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport?

Figure 4-E. Lambert PFC Funding
Source: FAA

Based on this data, no, the amount of PFC’s collected at Lambert were not
affected by the American Airlines’ reduction in hub service in 2009. The numbers
remain fairly consistent from 2009 forward, with a slight increase until 2012.
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
Securing an airports financial strength means having a well-balanced airport
financial management strategy in place in order to ensure an airport meets break-even
need during good times and bad. Airport sources of revenue, especially revenue
related to airlines must be managed with care at all times. Just as the events
previously described in the case study of Lambert St. Louis International Airport, this
th

was especially true for Lambert as the major external events including September 11 ,
the economic recession from March – November 2001, the economic recession from
December 2007 – June 2009, and the 2003 and 2009 reductions in American Airlines’
hub service at Lambert all caused fluctuations in the Operations, Revenue, AIP
Funding, and PFC Funding from 1999-2013 at Lambert. All of it had the potential to
interfere with Lambert’s financial strength during the time they were trying to complete
their new runway project.
As described in the findings, the analysis performed and the answers to the
research questions failed prove that fluctuations in the variables actually affected the
financial strength of Lambert. Overall, the data provided inconclusive results, with all
variables except for PFC’s rendered completely irrelevant. For example, September
11th may have caused fluctuations in the number of Operations that occurred at
Lambert, however, those fluctuations in Operations did not necessarily result in an
effect on the financial strength of Lambert. No proof exists. The research did,
however, reveal that PFC’s are very important! As described earlier in the literature
review, the bond-rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s Investor Service, and Standard
and Poor’s use PFC’s in order to evaluate passenger traffic (enplanements) and airport
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financial strength and credit. And the Government Accountability Office (GAO) backed
this by saying “A good indicator of airports’ financial strength is the number and scale of
underlying bond ratings provided by bond-rating agencies” (United States Government
Accountability Office, 2007, p. 14). Further research is highly recommended on PFC’s
and bond ratings and their respective effects on airport financial strength.
It can be assumed that the financial actions taken by Lambert such as
refinancing their bonds, creating the debt stabilization fund, and making adjustments to
their landing fees, for example, helped the airport to maintain its financial strength from
1999-2013. In fact, on June 23, 2011 Lambert’s credit rating was changed by Moody’s
Investor Service from a Baa1 (negative outlook) to Baa1 (stable outlook), and Standard
and Poor’s rated Lambert at A- (negative outlook) which was even higher than Moody’s
(Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 2011). And two years later, things improved
even more. As of May of 2013, Moody’s improved Lambert’s rating from Baa1 (stable
outlook) to A3 (stable outlook), and Standard and Poor’s also improved their rating from
A- (negative outlook) to A- (stable outlook) (Lambert St. Louis International Airport,
2013). According to Lambert’s newsroom, “This is the first time in more than a decade
that both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings for the airport have both been in the
single ‘A’ category” (Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 2013). Based upon these
credit ratings, and this research, it is safe to conclude that Lambert St. Louis
International Airport was able to survive the volatility of the major external events from
1999-2013 well, and has indeed maintained its financial strength.
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